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Abstract 
 
This article outlines some prospects for nonviolent, proactive countermeasures to ter-
rorism, essentially interreligious dialogue, with the aim and intention of incorporating 
multidisciplinary approaches to understanding associated phenomena and innovating 
appropriate dialogue projects. These projects would be intended to facilitate better un-
derstanding and improved relations between communities. This improved understand-
ing and better relations would be the end goal of attempting to address some of the root 
causes of terrorism and to attempt to ameliorate some of the damaging effects of terror-
ism.  
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“Islamism,” originally by way of French 
literature.6  This was, by the mid-1980s, 
no longer simply or even primarily a 
synonym for the religion of Islam in con-
temporary French usage.7 Graham Fuller 
argued in 1991 for the use of the term 
“ I s l am i sm ”  a s  o p p o s e d  t o 
“fundamentalism” to be used in many 
contexts as the phenomenon as it is not 
so much a theology as an ideology whose 
implications are not at all old fashioned 
but thoroughly modern.8 He gives a fur-
ther explication of his definition of the 
term Islamism in his 2003 work, The Fu-
ture of Political Islam.9 This would appear 
to include any Muslims who have a politi-
cal agenda. 
 
Fuller’s perspective would appear to be 
similar to those statements of the Ameri-
Since September 11, 2001, terrorism has 
been a heightened concern to many resi-
dents of Western liberal democracies, es-
pecially to the residents of the United 
States.1 The purpose of writing this article 
is to assess some important salient aspects 
of the phenomenon of terrorism as it af-
fects Westerners generally and to suggest 
some implications and prospects for ad-
dressing a selection of certain root causes 
of terrorism, utilizing nonviolent, proac-
tive methods as countermeasures.2 This 
proposal of proactive responses includes 
utilizing interfaith or interreligious dia-
logue as part of an integral strategy for 
addressing some of the root causes of ter-
rorism and ameliorating some of the ef-
fects of terrorism in multiple communi-
ties.3 It should be noted at this point that 
more areas of inquiry will be exposed 
where further research will be needed to 
assess feasibility and effectiveness: it is 
within the intended purpose of this article 
to direct more attention to areas of po-
tential inquiry and research.    
 
It becomes rapidly apparent in talking 
with North Americans with only a cur-
sory knowledge of terrorism and Islam-
ism that Islamism and terrorism are often 
popularly but mistakenly perceived to be 
necessarily coterminous.4 They are often 
seen as being a real threat to the Western 
way of life as lived in Western liberal de-
mocracies.5 Before embarking on an ex-
amination of terrorism, some explanation 
of the term “Islamism” would be in order.  
 
Martin Kramer traces the use of the term, 
“Islamism,” to the point where the use of 
the inexact term of “fundamentalism” has 
given way to a new use of the term, 
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more effectively targeting certain of the 
root causes of terrorism and for amelio-
rating the damaging effects of terrorism. 
 
Part of this strategy can include, for ex-
ample, formulating different choices of 
encountering the non-violent majority of 
Islamists with a selection of options 
amongst various genres of inter-religious 
dialog and encounter. This encounter can 
yield certain outcomes and strategic op-
tions that are in the interest of residents 
of Western liberal democracies and others 
elsewhere, with the objective of overcom-
ing prejudices and bigotries affecting mul-
tiple groups domestically and multi-
domestically.  
 
We can pursue certain areas of inquiry in 
understanding both terrorism and Islam-
ism, following the observations and rec-
ommendations of experts in various disci-
plines, including psychiatry, psychology, 
social psychology, law enforcement, social 
work, journalism and religious studies. 
Taken as a whole, the sum of these differ-
ent resultant observations can be consid-
ered along with some of the aspects of 
existing scholarship to form an under-
standing of these two phenomena. This 
understanding is relevant for the purpose 
of guiding inquiry into the prospects for 
nonviolent proactive countermeasures to 
terrorism. Amongst the possibilities of 
nonviolent proactive measures, there is 
the prospect of dialogue and peace-
building across communities, these op-
tions approaching the healing of the emo-
tional effects of grievances, including 
healing the aftereffects of previous terror 
attacks. Establishing mutual understand-
ing, respect, and acceptance can begin to 
can Assistant Secretary of State, Robert 
Pelletreau, Jr. in 1994; essentially that the 
term "Islamists" should describe Muslims 
with political goals and that this is an ana-
lytical term and not necessarily sinister.10 
The term “Islamists” can then be used to 
describe many legitimate, socially respon-
sible Muslim groups with political goals 
and these are different from those who 
operate outside the law, whom Pelletreau 
termed, “extremists.”11 If we accept that 
the term Islamist is widely in use and ac-
cepted as legitimate and not by itself pejo-
rative, it can be used analytically to de-
scribe a wide grouping of people who can 
be engaged in dialogue with, these being 
Muslims who generally who have political 
goals. 
 
The position taken in this article is that 
the vast majority of Muslims and 
Islamists are, in reality, people who do 
not support the killing of innocent civil-
ians as the terrorists do: the group of 
radicals who support the killing of civil-
ians is much smaller than the moder-
ates.12 However, attitudes exist amongst 
moderates in Muslim countries that have 
a negative or unfavorable view of the 
United States.13 This means that only a 
small minority of Islamists, by the wider 
definition, are radicalized and are not ap-
proachable for dialogue. In theory, the 
majority of moderates are not radicalized 
and most probably never will be. Still, 
however, they may have attitudes of the 
type that nonviolent approaches to inter-
religious dialogue may seek to overcome 
for improved relations. A clearer under-
standing and perspective of this reality 
may help more residents of Western de-
mocracies to prepare better strategies for 
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search analyzing attitudes in the Muslim 
world. Multidisciplinary qualitative re-
search can also be used within game-
theory analysis to overcome the lack of a 
powerful conceptual framework. 
 
The other tendency, mentioned by 
Moghaddam and borrowing from main-
stream psychology, is for researchers to 
split into dispositional and contextual 
camps.16 In this paper, variability in as-
pects of both dispositional factors and 
contextual factors are described for use 
within the Enders and Sandler game-
theory framework, thence utilizing a vari-
able selection of dialogue genres. This 
presents a better alternative arriving upon 
a more accurate viewpoint of treating the 
role of dispositional and contextual fac-
tors as being variable rather than fixed. 
 
The disposition of terrorists and others 
who are possibly sympathetic to terrorists 
can be described from expert perspectives 
including those of psychiatry.  Both the 
context and disposition of terrorists can 
be considered when formulating strategy. 
The qualitative analyses of dispositions 
involved and context is undertaken in for-
mulating a portfolio of choices within the 
game theory framework and associated 
quantitative analysis as described by En-
ders and Sandler.17 This utilization of 
game theory as a methodology is the 
starting point for discerning and describ-
ing a proper timing and place for the 
choice of nonviolent, proactive counter-
measures.  This method of game theory 
and quantitative analysis requires that a 
proper strategic assessment be made of 
context and be included in strategic mod-
eling and programming.  
overcome some root causes of enmity. 
 
Methodology 
 
This paper interprets the implications of a 
selection of observations and conclusions 
of existing research and scholarship in 
multiple disciplines and different fields 
relevant to the subjects terrorism and 
Islamism.  The observations and informa-
tion gleaned from the research projects 
and opinions of selected experts  are rele-
vant to formulating strategies for nonvio-
lent proactive countermeasures to terror-
ism. These are brought together to sug-
gest a strategic scope for nonviolent pro-
active countermeasures, such as interrelig-
ious dialogue, as either part of an aug-
menting factor to a portfolio of counter-
measures to terror or independently 
thereof. The final conclusions rely on ex-
tant research and propose certain avenues 
for further research and inquiry relevant 
to nonviolent proactive countermeasures. 
 
In discussing the methodology of this pa-
per and any other proposals for further 
research or strategy formulation derived 
from it, it may be wise to follow the ad-
vice of Moghaddam, who notes that psy-
chological research on terrorism suffers 
from two main weaknesses, both of 
which arise from weaknesses in main-
stream psychology.14 The weakness iden-
tified by Moghaddam, is that of a lack of 
powerful conceptual frameworksm and a 
reductionist-postitivist reliance on data 
gathering on the assumption that data will 
allow us to mimic the success of the "real 
sciences.”15 In this paper, this assumption 
of utilizing the game-theory framework 
also assumes making use of statistical re-
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tive options (for example, interreligious 
dialogue) and the dispositions of involved 
parties (for example, persons emotionally 
affected but amenable to peace-building.) 
The lesson that can be learned from the 
observation of weaknesses in research 
hitherto performed is that anyone using 
any of the nonviolent proactive strategic 
options suggested in this article should be 
savvy about dispositions of the persons 
involved and about the context in which 
they are located. Any research and publi-
cation about these projects should not 
repeat the two weaknesses described 
above by Moghaddam. These weaknesses 
can be overcome to some extent by un-
derstanding the psychological dispositions 
of prospective participants and by plan-
ning and matching, more optimally, a 
choice of genres of dialogue to the needs 
of all participants and the surrounding 
contexts.  
 
Why is Terrorism a Concern for  
Residents of Liberal Democracies? 
 
There are many reasons why Western lib-
eral democracies are specifically vulner-
It must be noted that any choice of vio-
lent/military options as proactive meas-
ures are a matter for officially authorized 
policy-makers and planners in govern-
ment and are beyond the scope of this 
article. The author of this article makes 
no statement whatsoever on their applica-
bility in any context. The important as-
sumption in this article is that there is a 
wider field of possibilities for nonviolent, 
proactive countermeasures to the root 
causes of terror if analysis for prospects 
of intervention are extended beyond the 
narrow field of violent extremists to the 
moderate majority of nonviolent Islamists. 
 
More can be said about the importance of 
taking context into consideration.  Palmer 
notes that terrorist threats should be con-
textualized, as the risks are small and to 
live in their thrall is to help them to 
achieve their aims.18 According to Stevens, 
it can be noted that psychological ap-
proaches to understanding, studying, and 
preventing terrorism must also draw on 
paradigms that link the individual to eco-
nomics, history, law, politics, religion, and 
culture:  a multidisciplinary approach to 
preparing nonviolent, proactive counter-
measures that will facilitate much-needed 
cooperation between experts in various 
disciplines.19  
 
The analysis associated with the game-
theory approach can integrate informa-
tion from these. A multidisciplinary ap-
proach to formulating nonviolent, proac-
tive options to respond to terrorism and/
or to ameliorate its damage can be con-
textualized in preparations for strategy 
formulation, understanding the role and 
context of the selected nonviolent, proac-
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intimidation of a large audience beyond 
that of the immediate victims.”27 This 
necessarily entails a political or social mo-
tive. Other definitions exist, for example 
a United Nations definition and a US 
Government definition.28 With all defini-
tions, what is important for our purposes 
is the recognition that terrorism has 
physical and psychological victims and 
that psychological damage is also associ-
ated with it. Associated with this injustice 
and damage in multiple communities are 
subsequent needs for healing and recon-
ciliation. 
 
The direct and indirect effects of terror-
ism on particular countries and on par-
ticular sectors can be sizeable, the indirect 
costs of foregone output, increased secu-
rity costs and increased risk premiums 
can be cumulative, and it is difficult to 
measure these various costs precisely.29 
Enders and Sandler conclude that terror-
able to terrorism. Liberal democracies are 
especially vulnerable to terrorist attacks.20 
Liberal democracies face a dilemma as 
many of the protections guaranteed to 
citizens of liberal democracies are ex-
ploited by terrorists, remaining an open 
society allows terrorists to work while too 
harsh a response can curb popular sup-
port and create support for these terror-
ists.21 If we assume that terrorism is a 
phenomenon that is here to stay as noted 
by Enders and Sandler,22 and Marvasti,23 
as long as there are persons with griev-
ances who will choose to use this as a 
cost-effective tactic for fighting, residents 
of Western liberal democracies must be 
concerned about it. Understanding the 
phenomenon of terrorism, strategies may 
be devised for dealing with terrorism as a 
perennial recurring phenomenon and 
therefore as a concern to residents of 
Western Liberal democracies.  
 
The Effects of Terrorism are a  
Human Concern 
 
It is generally true that terrorism is a hu-
man concern. It may also be seen to be a 
concern of the many and diverse resi-
dents of western liberal democracies.24  
This can be observed widely and it is 
common knowledge for anyone privy to 
the discourse taking place in the public 
sphere of the United States after Septem-
ber 11, 2001.25 Terrorism may be defined 
in different ways, and the label itself is 
often controversial.26 One definition of 
terrorism is offered by Enders and 
Sandler: being “the premeditated use or 
threat to use violence by individuals or 
subnational groups in order to obtain a 
political or social objective through the 
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Parallel with suffering 
caused by terrorism within 
the general  
population of  liberal  
Western democracies, the 
minority Muslim  
communities in these 
countries are also forced 
to carry a psychological 
burden. 
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damaging effects are taking place in the 
communities, as opposed to naively creat-
ing injustices for minority Muslims or 
others. 
 
An example of this need for a better ap-
proach can be seen where Githens-Mazer 
and Lambert further opine that, 
“Conventional wisdom on radicalization 
has sapped this term of scientific value, so 
that the label of ‘radicalization’ has be-
come instead a tool of power exercised by 
the state and non-Muslim communities 
against, and to control, Muslim communi-
ties.34 If this is true, the approach by En-
ders and Sandler is a much better alterna-
tive to the amateurishness of accepting 
unsupported assumptions and partisan 
prescriptions which can end up oppress-
ing the wrong choice of people in one or 
more communities.  Nonetheless, because 
this injustice towards minority Muslims 
occurs, there is a need and an opportunity 
domestically to engage in a selection of 
nonviolent, proactive methods for engag-
ing these communities that will be de-
signed to ameliorate the damage and heal 
the communities involved. 
 
Why Ordinary People Become  
Terrorists 
 
The literature on the psychology of ter-
rorists is too vast to systematically de-
scribe here and a selection must be made. 
For the purposes of this article, address-
ing some of the root causes of terrorism, 
individual dispositions, i.e. typical pat-
terns of individual motivations of terror-
ists can often be understood as providing 
some insight into the root causes of ter-
rorism that can be addressed and also 
ism is here to stay…as long as there are 
grievances there will be conflict and that 
terrorism will be a cost-effective tactic of 
the weaker side associated with these con-
flicts.30 Marvasti is similar in his opinion 
to Enders and Sandler in seeing that sui-
cide bombing will continue as long as 
there are life situations in which people 
feel that this type of violence is the only 
way to change their world and to improve 
their nation or their tribe’s status quo.31 
Indeed, the problem of terrorism will not 
go away on its own. 
 
Parallel with the suffering caused by ter-
rorism within the general population of 
liberal Western democracies, the minority 
Muslim communities in these countries 
are also often forced to carry a psycho-
logical burden. Popular thinking about 
terrorism has often been associated with 
the term “radicalization.”  As Githens-
Mazer and Lambert note, the current 
“wisdom” on radicalization is a failed dis-
course.32 Policy-makers and the media 
have come to rely increasingly on a 
‘conventional wisdom’ of radicalization… 
radicalization is a research topic plagued 
by assumption and intuition, unhappily 
dominated by ‘conventional wisdom’ 
rather than systematic scientific and em-
pirically based research.33 This is where 
the potential of Enders and Sandler’s ap-
proach offers a solution, pointing to these 
more scientific approaches to understand-
ing and dealing with the whole problem 
of terrorism. Their game-theory approach 
can be made multidisciplinary, combining 
with other scientific methods to facilitate 
plans to ameliorate the damaging effects 
of terrorism. These could be better fo-
cused on where the real problems and 
Terrorism, Islamism, and Western Liberal Democracies
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include dialogue leading to understanding 
beyond such a narrow focus on terrorists 
that can potentially include all persons 
emotionally affected. For planning these 
nonviolent, proactive measures, an under-
standing of disposition is necessary to 
better differentiate where dialogue is and 
is not practicable. 
 
Multiple perspectives on motives exist 
and there are perspectives that terrorists 
are psychologically sick and that their mo-
tivations are sick.36 Palmer notes that, it is 
possible that terrorists, leaders perhaps 
more than their actors, may have issues in 
the realms of personality, describing them 
as sometimes hardened individuals.37 
Arena and Arrigo describe a contention 
that identity plays a role in the commis-
sion of terrorism, prior research relying 
on psychological assertions that individu-
als are searching for identity, this leading 
to conclusions that something is pro-
foundly wrong or abnormal with terror-
ists.38 In frightening contrast to the com-
proposing where dialogue should be 
avoided.  The motivational factors in 
terms of disposition and context are var-
ied and complex but a psychological pat-
tern or set of patterns can often be dis-
cerned in nonviolent moderates to which 
nonviolent proactive measures can be ad-
dressed. These negative attitudes cannot 
be addressed in extremists but rather can 
be addressed more broadly in the wider 
population of moderates. 
 
Palmer notes that, terrorism becomes 
morally polarized and politically manipu-
lated, causing debate and understanding 
to thus be required if terrorism is to be 
managed.35 While Palmer is most likely 
advocating a debate about a narrow topic 
of terrorism, his mention of 
“understanding” may be followed and 
extended to a broader context of the phe-
nomenon including its root causes. In 
terms of this wider focus of inquiry and 
discussion, a choice could be made to in-
clude nonviolent, proactive measures that 
Terrorism, Islamism, and Western Liberal Democracies
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standing and dialogue.42 This presence of 
deep emotions is an obstacle to dialogue 
apparent and familiar to anyone experi-
enced in the field. This obstacle is not ab-
solutely insurmountable, however, as 
Muslim and non-Muslim communities in 
Western countries are variegated and not 
monolithic, multiple genres of dialogue 
have been identified.43 Understanding this 
variegation of communities and also the 
options of different genres of dialogue 
expands the range of possibilities for 
matching a genre of dialogue well with 
the needs of the community in context. 
The generally negative attitudes seen in a 
wider population of Muslim moderates 
described previously by Esposito and 
Mogahed are relevant in this respect as 
they show a larger prospect pool for dia-
logue.44  
 
Post et al. provide various psychological 
models, individual and group models that 
may contribute to the explanation of sui-
cide bombing, and they also look at vari-
ous areas where psychiatry may be able to 
contribute to the interdisciplinary under-
standing of this phenomenon.45 Within 
the context of these descriptions, factors 
described by Marvasti begin to look con-
sistent with these descriptions of group 
and individual models. In explaining part 
of the psychological makeup of suicide 
bombers, Marvasti describes PTSD, 
caused by years of trauma, homelessness, 
displacement, humiliation, and loss of 
family and friends in conflict with the oc-
cupying army as partly explaining the pro-
liferation of suicide bombers.46 Marvasti 
also identifies elements of rage and re-
venge, psychic trauma and dissociation, 
the element of religion, the element of 
mon notion that terrorists are necessarily 
sick and that this psychology explains 
their behavior, Arena and Arrigo identify 
an alternative notion as a possibility that 
terrorists are essentially normal individu-
als: more explanation from a social-
psychological context, especially in terms 
of the impact of identity on extremist vio-
lence, is needed.39 Post et al. note con-
vincingly that suicide terror groups screen 
out mentally ill individuals.40 
 
Whether terrorists are sick or not, the ef-
fects of terrorism are manifest and remain. 
Palmer notes that terrorist acts create 
moral revulsion, indignation, and right-
eousness and stimulate the drive for 
moral justification by all parties in-
volved.41 The deep emotions engendered 
are generally not conducive to under-
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Marvasti provides some useful insight 
into the psychology of terrorists which 
yields information on the root causes of 
this terrorism and suggests some different 
possibilities for addressing these causes.51 
Marvasti outlines the alleviation of trauma 
and the support for moderate activists 
and policies as a crucial factor.52 While 
the selection of options, defensive and 
proactive, is most often best done by au-
thorized parties of the state, the option of 
nonviolent proactive measures can be of 
particular interest to concerned residents 
of Western liberal democracies. As Li-
akatali Takim describes, this is a new ex-
perience for Muslims in America, a para-
digm shift away from their attempts at 
converting others, to conversation with 
others.53 The openness of Western de-
mocracies provides venues and opportu-
nities in contrast to an often very differ-
ent reality elsewhere. This can be seen 
described according to Takim as, 
“Muslims did not, generally speaking, feel 
the need to dialogue or converse with the 
other….hence, engaging in dialogue with 
non-Muslims is a relatively new experi-
ence for most Muslims, since many of 
them are accustomed to preaching Islam 
and to refuting the beliefs of the other.”54 
This openness of Western liberal democ-
racies also has the potential to foster this 
paradigm shift over to an interesting en-
counter with plurality, fostering a plural-
istic discourse which has often been ne-
glected. 
 
Rather than merely following the conven-
tional wisdom and developing strategies 
with undesirable effects as criticized ear-
lier by Githens-Mazer and Lambert, En-
ders’ and Sandler’s rationale of using 
group process, support and bonding, 
poverty, the element of perceived injus-
tice, humiliation, shame and despair, cul-
tural support, and remuneration as factors 
in the motivation for suicide bombers.47  
Post et al.’s description of the need for a 
multi-disciplinary approach can be seen in 
addressing the individual factors that are 
embedded in the development of a sui-
cide terrorist.48 Post opines that, the im-
mediate consequence of this framework is 
that efforts to prevent suicide terrorism 
must be directed at all the necessary but 
insufficient factors that result in suicide 
terrorism….cross-disciplinary collabora-
tion appears warranted, and indeed is re-
quired.49 
 
Strategic Alternatives/Proactive 
Measures For Addressing The Root 
Causes of Terrorism 
 
To follow the rationale and logic of En-
ders and Sandler’s game theory frame-
work for understanding terrorism, the 
factors and individual reasons for why 
ordinary people become terrorists may be 
assessed as the root causes to be ad-
dressed within these certain nonviolent 
options.50  The selection of these options 
should take into consideration the psy-
chological dispositions of different per-
sons inclined to be sympathetic to terror-
ists and their pursuits. Some persons can 
be engaged in dialogue and others cannot 
be engaged. Understanding these aspects 
of the psychological disposition of com-
munity members as prospective dialogue 
partners is useful for understanding the 
purpose, scope and choice of nonviolent, 
proactive countermeasures.  
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option. 
 
Within this game-theory framework and 
statistical analysis suggested by Enders 
and Sandler the choices generated can 
include defensive and nonviolent proac-
tive options to deal with terrorism. To 
begin to address some of the root causes 
of terrorism, the experimental work of 
Mark R. Dixon, Kimberly M. Zlomke, & 
Ruth Anne Rehfeldt (2006) may have cer-
tain implications for the possible benefits 
of the options of inter-religious dialog 
between Muslims and others.  
 
These authors conducted two experi-
ments relying on the application of rela-
tional frame theory. They concluded that 
Americans’ nonequivalent frames of 
“terrorism” and “America” can be par-
tially reconstructed via a matching to 
sample procedure; their two experiments 
provide data suggesting that prejudice is 
not human nature and that it need not be 
accepted as such.58 The authors describe 
that the dismantling of pre-existing rela-
game theory and statistical analysis pro-
vides an approach to formulating strate-
gies for dealing with terrorism, which can 
draw on multidisciplinary competencies.  
Within the portfolio of options that this 
utilization of game theory generates, there 
is an option of dialogue, which is both 
nonviolent and proactive.  
 
The author of this article accepts that 
there are people for and with whom dia-
logue is quite obviously not an option: 
they are simply too psychologically and 
politically radicalized due to the severities 
of their own personal histories. This real-
ity should be clear for anybody who un-
derstands the personalities involved with 
terror movements such as Al-Qaeda.55 It 
would be naïve to assume that members 
of these movements can be approached 
for interreligious dialogue.  However, the 
majority of persons in Western liberal de-
mocracies and in the Muslim world are 
not within that category of psychological 
and political radicalization and extreme 
thought. Therefore opportunities do exist. 
Enders and Sandler do address the possi-
bility of getting at the roots of terrorism, 
one option being addressing the griev-
ances of the terrorists and eliminating the 
rationale for violence.56 However, prob-
lems can arise following this course of 
action. The problems and tradeoffs en-
countered by government in deciding 
whether or not to dialogue with terrorists 
are described by Enders and Sandler.57 
The prospects and decisions of these op-
tions to dialogue directly with terrorists 
are best left to authorized members of 
government and military, and not to ordi-
nary citizens. Dialogue with non-
extremist moderates may however be an 
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better relations. 
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ing terrorist agendas in any way, is sage 
advice for anyone planning on engaging 
in any real dialogue. It is also realistic ad-
vice for realizing that there are some indi-
viduals who are simply too hardened and 
radicalized to be approached for nonvio-
lent proactive countermeasures such as 
dialogue, even if they are rational actors.62 
The scope of interreligious dialogue 
should be directed to take place with the 
community in general, not with radical-
ized and extreme individuals. Participants 
will also need to be savvy of any legal 
considerations relevant to dialogue. 
 
Before embarking on a discussion of in-
terreligious dialogue, it can be noted that 
alleviating the effects of terrorism and 
minimizing or controlling its damage has 
been one of the responses of govern-
tional frames of sameness and opposition 
can occur in part through the introduc-
tion of additional stimuli from another 
stimulus network that may provide an 
overarching transfer of function through 
an existing stimulus network.59 More 
analysis would be needed but the results 
of this work could tend to suggest that 
the frameworks and stimuli provided in 
venues where different genres of interre-
ligious dialog are being carried out should 
be studied to assess their impact for dis-
mantling prejudices and for improving 
relations across communities. Contrary to 
the notion that dialogue is a waste of time 
or that it accomplishes nothing, the re-
search taking place might help to explain 
if dialogue provides a frame in which 
prejudices can be dismantled, negative 
attitudes can be changed, and understand-
ing can be facilitated. In other words, de-
spite whatever apparent content is on the 
agenda of the interreligious dialogue, a 
psychological change could be happening 
in the participants and audience, that 
makes way for better relations. 
 
The harsh reality of the context surround-
ing dialogue in the West is worthy of note 
as Palmer opines that, whether or not ter-
rorists have personality or mental disor-
ders, if they have the capacity, they must 
face the due legal sanctions for their ac-
tions.60 Palmer opines that we should be 
careful not to elevate terrorists or those 
who espouse terror to the level of free-
dom fighter, politician or hero.61 This atti-
tude towards terrorists being held respon-
sible can be expected to be ubiquitous in 
Western liberal democracies. Therefore 
his advice of avoiding any romanticizing 
of terrorism, and certainly NOT facilitat-
Terrorism, Islamism, and Western Liberal Democracies
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coping strategies of one group of Ameri-
cans in managing posttraumatic stress fol-
lowing a major terrorist attack was dem-
onstrated: in certain sampled groups, 
positive spiritual coping strategies were 
strongly related to positive spiritual out-
comes.67 Spiritual measures such as, seek-
ing comfort from God, prayer, and at-
tending faith services, are common be-
haviors in the broader Christian commu-
nity and beyond.68 Although the sample 
consists of certain church members, simi-
lar reactions among participants in other 
faith communities are a possibility that 
warrants further investigation.69 The use 
of spiritual approaches would appear to 
be evidenced as helpful in some situations 
and cases. These findings may suggest 
that dialogue has benefits. Despite the 
possible limitations of the research, being 
that some people are predisposed to spiri-
tual solutions, this research overall could 
point to the utility of interreligious dia-
logue as a spiritual approach to healing 
and reconciliation between non-
radicalized but nonetheless affected per-
sons. 
 
It should be stated at this point that the 
evidence for the benefits of interreligious 
dialogue for addressing the above men-
tioned root causes of terrorism is mostly 
anecdotal and there is a need for further 
inquiry and research into the effects of 
interreligious dialogue on the attitudes 
and well-being of involved groups.  It has 
been the observation of the author within 
a Nordic context that sessions of interre-
ligious dialogue have had a positive im-
pact on the attitudes of members of Mus-
lim communities faced with feelings of 
humiliation and rage when shown genu-
ments to terrorism.63 Some wisdom might 
be gleaned here from the British psychia-
trist, Ian Palmer, who stresses the need 
for contextualization of acts of terror, 
their perpetrators, their effects on popula-
tions and individuals, and attention to the 
psychology of groups.64 Palmer also sug-
gest that mental health commentators 
should endeavor to learn more about 
group behavior and the predisposing, pre-
cipitating, perpetuating and protective 
factors that take place in the manifesta-
tion of fear and fear-related conditions in 
society.65 Post et al. maintain that we can-
not prevent suicide terrorism in the abso-
lute sense but efforts towards reducing 
this phenomenon are obviously of the 
highest importance and these efforts must 
derive from understanding the phenome-
non itself.66 This expert psychiatric call 
for more research in this area may be ex-
tended to the effects of dialogue within 
and upon such conditions. Research 
could be made into the effects of interre-
ligious dialogue on attitudes of participant 
groups and their individual members, es-
pecially to see if it changes the stereotypes 
and bigotries present in societies and im-
proves relations. 
 
Inter-Religious Dialogue as a  
Countermeasure to the Root Causes of 
Terrorism 
 
There is another aspect of interreligious 
dialogue that can be interesting: dialogue 
as a coping mechanism, ameliorating the 
effects of terrorism. Evidence exists for 
the utility of some spiritual approaches to 
ameliorating the psychological effects of 
terrorism.  In one study by Meisenhelder 
and Marcum, the success and spectrum of 
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interpreted and articulated by classical 
and medieval exegetes.73 In a sense simi-
lar to the kind of openness in interpreta-
tion as described by Liakatali Takim, 
Pratt’s observations may and perhaps also 
ought to be taken into consideration 
when planning dialogue. Pratt and Takim 
both mention the issue of hermeneutics, 
discussing their own perspectives on how 
obstacles might be overcome. 
 
However, in another sense, this realm of 
obstacles associated with scriptural her-
meneutics and apodicity or non-apodicity 
are arguably not the whole story of inter-
religious dialogue as, even if there is in-
flexibility concerning certain truth claims, 
the psychology and attitudes of persons 
and communities involved in dialogue 
may change in a positive way if respect 
and acceptance is sincerely demonstrated 
and this should be researched further, re-
gardless of obstacles. It should also be 
noted especially in this respect that multi-
ple genres of dialogue exist which are not 
necessarily impeded by inflexibility in 
truth claims regarding scripture. This plu-
rality of dialogue genres can also offer a 
response to overcome certain issues or 
obstacles that may be associated with 
identity affecting people’s participation in 
interreligious dialogue.74 Multiple genres 
of interreligious dialogue exist and can be 
considered as alternatives, expanding in 
some cases the applicability of such ap-
proaches vis a vis heretofore resistant 
members of certain identity groups. In-
flexibility in truth claims can also at times 
be side-stepped in dialogue and commu-
nity building by choice of dialogue genre, 
if necessary. 
 
ine respect by their Christian dialogue 
partners.70 The implications generally 
would be to assess the utility of such dia-
logue for all groups affected by terror, 
Muslim, Christian, and others.  More sci-
entific research into the benefits of such 
interreligious dialogue would be necessary 
to be able to assess accurately what bene-
fits may proceed from such activities.  
 
An approach to planning the content of 
nonviolent, proactive countermeasures to 
terror in the form of interreligious dia-
logue could be researched in a multidisci-
plinary way taking into consideration the 
disposition and context of the events that 
have taken place and overcoming the 
weaknesses of research identified by 
Moghaddam. Perhaps the earlier sugges-
tion of Palmer, that we must become 
more knowledgeable of groups and 
should engage in dialogue, could be ex-
tended with good effects to this kind of 
group also (not to terrorists but to peace-
builders).71   
 
In terms of process, dialogue in the inter-
est of peace-building can be expected to 
happen upon hermeneutical obstacles. 
This dialogue would also be a good test 
of the claim by Pratt concerning non-
apodicity in Christian-Muslim dialogue, 
that unless participants are willing to be 
flexible on truth claims in scripture, dia-
logue will lead to disappointing results.72 
Appearing to touch on the same issue as 
Pratt mentions, Liakat Ali Takim opines 
of a need for Muslims to more clearly dif-
ferentiate between sacred scripture and 
later exegesis: differentiation can be made 
between the Qur’anic vision and the socio
-political context in which that vision was 
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despair, cultural support, and remunera-
tion as parts of the motivation for suicide 
bombers.”78 What interreligious dialogue 
begins to address is many of these same  
root causes. This is done by demonstrat-
ing mutual acceptance and respect as de-
scribed by Ayoub. There can be multiple 
genres of dialogue and multiple venues 
chosen for this purpose of demonstrating 
sincere mutual respect and acceptance. 
The question might also be asked if 
Pratt’s observation could be helpful in 
this respect, that, “the recognition of non
-apodicity applies across all revelatory 
scripture… ameliorating the effects of 
difference by discerning of a deeper truth 
or revelation transcending the differ-
ences…”79 Inquiry might well be made 
into Pratt’s observations about whether 
or not the mutual respect and partnership 
that Ayoub talks about might be better 
facilitated with Pratt’s approach and sug-
gestions. If Muslims and Christians would 
be more open to exploring truth together, 
would the demonstration of respect and 
acceptance not be even more effectively 
facilitated? We could hope for a venue of 
healing analogous to what was found to 
be taking place by Meisenhelder and 
Marcum. This being the case, the ultimate 
analysis has to be made, asking if any of 
this dialogue effort makes any positive 
and meaningful difference in the long run. 
 
A more specific differentiating process 
between peaceful and militant strains of 
Islam can also be taken up directly in 
preparations for dialogue. Takim opines 
that, “the tension between the peaceful 
and militant strains of Islam can be re-
solved only through reexamining the spe-
cific contexts of the rulings and the ways 
To provide some of the framework for 
planning and carrying out dialogue in 
terms of the end results of dialogue, Ay-
oub’s suggestion of theoretical goals and 
obstacles of Christian-Muslim dialog can 
be considered.75 The potential of interre-
ligious dialogue for addressing certain 
root causes of terrorism at the level of 
individual disposition and at the level of 
community can be expressed in these end 
results. This is important for the content 
of dialogue and the initial intentions of 
involved parties. Ayoub opines that Mus-
lims and Christians must accept each 
other as friends and partners in the quest 
for social and political justice…this de-
manding genuine and sincere respect of 
the faith of the other, including their be-
liefs, ethical principles, social values and 
political aspirations.76 Ayoub hopes for 
accepting each other as equal partners, 
not opponents in dialogue, meaning 
equality in humanity and dignity, and 
equality in the claim for religious authen-
ticity.77 This hoped-for outcome would 
be something very different from the 
damage and grievances seen by experts in 
the field of psychiatry in the disposition 
of terrorists and people who are sympa-
thetic to them.  
 
Within this context of goals for interrelig-
ious dialogue suggested by Ayoub, we can 
hearken back to and reference some of 
the factors and motivations of the root 
causes of suicide bombers as identified 
earlier by Marvasti as being the “elements 
of rage and revenge, psychic trauma and 
dissociation, the element of religion, the 
element of group process, support and 
bonding, poverty, the element of per-
ceived injustice, humiliation, shame and 
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causes as described by Marvasti.  This has 
little potential with extremists but, in the-
ory, a larger population of moderates can 
be involved, being self-differentiated 
from the militants. 
 
Although this may be beneficial at the 
individual level, what can be seen at the 
level of the group and community is that 
the practical programming and planning 
of dialogue is a matter requiring more 
complex expertise, vision and a set of 
necessary skills.  For planning this dia-
logue, the portfolio of different genres of 
interreligious dialogue described by Jane I. 
Smith can be considered as possible op-
tions, these being described in more detail 
in the suggested materials on interrelig-
ious and inter-Muslim dialogue.81 A meth-
odology for strategy formulation in plan-
ning interreligious dialogue between 
Christians and Muslims using these gen-
res of dialogue was also proposed by Ar-
gon.82 Formulating strategies for utilizing 
different genres of dialogue requires hav-
ing knowledge of different pre-existing 
religious institutions engaging in dialogue 
and their dialogue projects.  
 
To take into consideration some of the 
observations of Moghaddam’s critique of 
psychological research, interreligious dia-
logue is always within a communal con-
text, in addition to individual dispositions. 
Possibilities for programming approaches 
to a dialogue across communities which 
may begin to address some of these root 
causes in communal context is described 
by different authors. Examples of Chris-
tian perspectives on interfaith dialogue 
can be found in the work edited by Rev. 
Bud Heckman and Rori Picker Neiss, In-
in which they were conditioned by the 
times…this re-interpretive task demands 
that Muslims re-evaluate the classical and 
medieval juridical corpus.”80 This activity 
may be useful for Muslims who are intel-
lectually equipped to maintain the integ-
rity and moral fiber of the tradition but 
who also would like to pursue a fruitful 
discourse with non-Muslims leading to 
respect, acceptance and cooperation. This 
effort can be with the intention to begin 
to ameliorate some of the negative after-
effects of terrorism and address the root 
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tutions in North America will be privy to 
or affected by the presence of the “A 
Common Word” initiative.89 What can be 
seen of the signatories to the Common 
Word document is that a large number of 
intellectuals and institutions in the Mus-
lim world are interested in pursuing better 
relations with Christians.  This would sug-
gest at least willingness towards dialogue 
by individuals and institutions across the 
Muslim world and in minority communi-
ties in Western liberal democracies. 
 
At the broader level of dialogue across 
communities, Islamists in different insti-
tutions can be considered as part of the 
solution in dialogue in addressing the root 
causes of terrorism.90 This is often the 
case as those revival movements and Is-
lamic institutions that exist in North 
America and throughout the Muslim 
world as a whole are often willing and 
able to carry on interreligious dialogue. 
The main point is that multiple institu-
tions in the Muslim world and within 
Western minority Muslim communities 
are concerned about the future of Islam 
and Muslims and are often interested to 
carry on with interreligious dialogue and 
have programs for doing so. Some of 
them have an ideology for creating an Is-
lamic state with the end goal of establish-
ing an Islamic society. Others have no 
ideology of creating an Islamic state yet 
are nonetheless sincerely concerned for 
the future of Muslims and society in gen-
eral. Both categories can be engaged. This 
plurality of Islamists also suggests the di-
versity in dispositions and a field of op-
portunities for dialogue, outlining a scope 
for diversified content and different gen-
res of interreligious dialogue. 
teractive Faith: The Essentials Interrelig-
ious Community Handbook.83 An exam-
ple of a contemporary theoretical frame-
work from a Muslim perspective on com-
munity and multi-religious peace-building 
may be found in Abu-Nimer’s Nonvio-
lence and Peacebuilding in Islam.84 Chris-
tian or Muslim, the intention expressed in 
these works is for dialogue to benevo-
lently affect a community, not to be re-
duced to individual dispositions. These 
proposed models of dialogue might be 
able to provide venues of effectuating 
change such as dismantling prejudices as 
suggested in the findings of research de-
scribed earlier by Mark R. Dixon, Kim-
berly M. Zlomke, & Ruth Anne Rehfeldt 
(2006). 
 
Dialogue between Christians and Muslims 
has had an extensive history in the twenti-
eth century and is not a new project.85 It 
should be noted that there is not only a 
demonstrated willingness to dialogue and 
a history of doing so, but also an extant 
infrastructure for dialogue.  Some exam-
ples can be cited to demonstrate this real-
ity, although this listing must not be seen 
as comprehensive or exclusive. A repre-
sentative sampling of major and minor 
Islamic organizations in North America 
can be seen to engage in dialogue: the Is-
lamic Society of North America has an 
active dialogue unit.86 The Vatican has 
engaged in interreligious dialogue, ex-
panding and developing its dialogue, es-
pecially since the Second Vatican Council 
from 1962-1965.87 The World Council of 
Churches also has a history of fostering 
dialogue.88 Institutions and infrastructure 
for dialogue have decades of presence 
internationally. All of these Islamic insti-
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Conclusion 
 
It would appear that the group of persons 
affected by terror is indeed a large part of 
the population in Western liberal democ-
racies and also a large part of populations 
in other countries. There may be certain 
desirable outcomes of dialogue to be rea-
sonably expected, extending to Muslims, 
Christians and others in dialogue and to 
any others affected by terrorism. More 
research will be necessary to discern what, 
if any, benefits of dialogue exist in ame-
liorating the effects of terrorism.  More 
research will be needed in exploring the 
effects of dialogue beyond the anecdotal 
evidence of participants. However, there 
are definitely promising avenues for fur-
ther inquiry and research. A multidiscipli-
nary approach can be seen to be called 
for by experts as referenced in this article.  
 
Interested persons may know that, with 
nonviolent, proactive approaches to ad-
dressing root causes of terror, they have 
certain abilities to rely on the work of ex-
perts in multiple fields and disciplines to 
strive to achieve a common good. With 
this multidisciplinary approach and re-
search, including that of other specialists 
in religion and interreligious dialogue, we 
might hope that the “fundamental re-
quirement of honest and constructive dia-
logue” becomes more of a reality as op-
posed to remaining an “ideal hope.”91 
This dialogue could be made more of a 
reality, bringing persons in multiple com-
munities to a place of mutual respect, ac-
ceptance and hopefully even to a more 
globalized peace.  
 
Terrorism, Islamism, and Western Liberal Democracies
44 Journal of Global Development and Peace
& Ruth Anne Rehfeldt, “Restoring 
Americans’ Nonequivalent Frames of 
Terror: An Application of Relational 
Frame Theory,”  The Behavior Analyst 
Today Volume 7, Number 3, 2006, pp. 
275-289. 
 
• John L. Esposito & Dalia Mogahed, 
Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion 
Muslims Really Think, New York, 
NY: Gallup Press, 2007. 
 
• Graham E. Fuller, The Future of Po-
litical Islam, (New York: Palgrave-
Macmillan, 2003. 
 
• Graham E. Fuller, Islamic Fundamen-
talism in the Northern Tier Countries: 
An Integrative View, Santa Monica, 
RAND, 1991. 
 
• Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: 
Global Network of Terror,  Columbia 
University Press, New York, NY, 
2002 
 
• Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Jane I. 
Smith, The Quest for “A Common 
Word”: Initial Christian Responses to 
a Muslim Initiative, Islam and Christian-
Muslim Relations, Vol. 20, No. 4, 369-
388, October 2009. 
 
• Bud Heckman and Rori Neiss, Inter-
active Faith: The Essential Interrelig-
ious Community Building Handbook, 
Woodstock, VT: Skylight Paths Pub-
lishing, 2009. 
 
• Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of 
Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs, Summer 
References: 
 
• Muhammad Abu-Nimer, Nonviolence 
and Peacebuilding in Islam, University 
Press of Florida, Gainsville, Florida, 
2003. 
 
• Michael P. Arena and Bruce A. Arrigo, 
Social Psychology, Terrorism, and 
Identity, Behavioral Sciences and Law, 
Vol. 23 (2005) pp.485-506. 
 
• Argon, Kemal, 'Strategies for Interre-
ligious and Inter-Muslim Dialogue: A 
Proposed Methodology,'Journal of Mus-
lim Minority Affairs, 2009, Vol. 29:3, 
2009; pp. 355-367. 
 
• Asmundson, Carleton, Wright, and 
Taylor, “Psychological Sequelae of 
Remote Exposure to the September 
11th Terrorist Attacks in Canadians 
with and Without Panic,” Cognitive Be-
haviour Therapy Vol 33, No 2, pp.51-59, 
2004. 
 
• Mahmoud Ayoub, “Christian-Muslim 
Dialogue: Goals and Obstacles,” The 
Muslim World, Vol. 94; July 2004. 
 
• John Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghani-
stan, America, and International Ter-
rorism, Third edition, Pluto Press, 
London, U.K., 2002. 
 
• Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, The 
Political Economy of Terrorism, 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2006. 
 
• Mark R. Dixon, Kimberly M. Zlomke, 
Terrorism, Islamism, and Western Liberal Democracies
Journalof Global Development and Peace
 
• Ian Palmer, Terrorism, suicide bomb-
ing, fear and mental health, Interna-
tional Review of Psychiatry, June 2007; 19
(3): 289–296. 
 
• Jerrold M. Post, Farhana Ali, Schuyler 
W. Henderson, Stephen Shanfield, 
Jeff Victoroff and Stevan Weine,  
“The Psychology of Suicide Terror-
ism,” Psychiatry 72(1) Spring 2009, p14. 
 
• Douglass Pratt, “The Vatican in dia-
logue with Islam: Inclusion and En-
gagement,” Islam and Christian-Muslim 
Relations, Vol. 21, No. 3, July 2010, pp. 
245-262. 
 
• Douglass Pratt, “Necessary Non-
Apodicity: Hermeneutic Priority and 
Textual Authority in Christian-Muslim 
Dialogue,” Islam and Christian-Muslim 
Relations, Vol. 20, No. 3, 291-303, July 
2009. 
 
• Melanie Prideaux, “The Significance 
of Identity in Muslim-Christian En-
counter,” Islam and Christian-Muslim 
Relations, Vol. 20, No. 2, 153-170, 
April 2009. 
 
• Richman, Cloninger, Rospenda, 
“Macrolevel Stressors, Terrorism, and 
Mental Health Outcomes: Broadening 
the Stress Paradigm,” American Journal 
of Public Health, Vol 98, No.2, Febru-
ary 2008, pp. 323-329. 
 
• Ataullah Siddiqui, Christian-Muslim 
Dialogue in the Twentieth Century, 
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. 
1993, pp22-49. 
 
• Martin Kramer, “Coming to Terms, Fun-
damentalists or Islamists?” Middle East 
Quarterly (Spring 2003), pp. 65-77. 
Also at www.meforum.org/541/
coming-to-terms-islamists-or-
fundamentalists; accessed 11/08/2010. 
 
• Bernard Lewis, “Freedom and Justice 
in Islam,” Social Science and Modern Soci-
ety, Volume 44, Number 2, pp.66-70. 
 
• Jamshid A. Marvasti, Psycho-Political 
Aspects of Suicide Warriors, Terror-
ism, and Martyrdom: A critical View 
from “Both Sides” in Regard to Cause 
and Cure, Charles C. Thomas Pub-
lisher, Ltd., Springfield, Illinois, 2008. 
 
• Jonathan Githens-Mazer and Robert 
Lambert, “Why conventional wisdom 
on radicalization fails: the persistence 
of a failed discourse,”   International 
Affairs  Vol. 86: No. 4 (2010) pp. 889–
890;  2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/
The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs. 
 
• Janice Bell Meisenhelder and John P. 
Marcum, “Terrorism, Post-traumatic 
Stress, Coping Strategies, and Spiritual 
Outcomes,” Journal of Religion and 
Health, (2009) Vol. 48, p. 45-57 
Springer Science and Business Media, 
B.V. 
 
• Fathali M. Moghadam, “The New 
Global American Dilemma and Ter-
rorism,” Political Psychology, Vol. 30, No. 
3, 2009. 
Terrorism, Islamism, and Western Liberal Democracies
45
46 Journal of Global Development and Peace
Endnotes: 
1. See for example, Michelle Slone, 
Anat Shoshani, “Indirect Victimi-
zation from Terrorism: A Pro-
posed Post-Exposure Interven-
tion,” Journal of Mental Health Coun-
seling, Volume 30, Number 3, July 
2008, PP 255–256.  
2. Throughout this article, the as-
sumption is taken that terrorism is 
most often in a marginalized posi-
tion relative to the position of 
Islamism generally. For more in-
formation on Muslim attitudes see 
John L. Esposito & Dalia Moga-
hed, Who Speaks for Islam? What 
a Billion Muslims Really Think, 
(New York, NY: Gallup Press, 
2007). 
3. See M.P. Arena and B. A. Arrigo, 
“Social Psychology, Terrorism and 
Identity,” Behavioral Science and Law, 
Vol. 23, (2005) p503 for an opin-
ion on the importance of address-
ing root causes of terror.  
4. The perspective in this article is 
that the two are only coterminous 
in a small minority of Muslims. 
This being the case, there is specu-
lation that terrorism is set to ex-
pand to encompass a diverse plu-
rality of ideologies and associa-
tions. See C. D. Walton, “Not 
Only Islamism: Great Power Poli-
tics and the Future of Terrorism,” 
Comparative Strategy, Vol. 26, 2007, 
21-37. 
 
• Michelle Slone, Anat Shoshani, 
“Indirect Victimization from Terror-
ism: A Proposed Post-Exposure In-
tervention,” Journal of Mental Health 
Counseling, Volume 30, Number 3, July 
2008, PP 255–266. 
 
• Jane I. Smith, “Muslims as Partners in 
Interfaith Encounter: Models for Dia-
logue”, in Muslims’ Place in the 
American Public Square: Hope, Fears, 
and Aspirations, eds Z. H. Bukhari, S. 
S. Nyang,M. Ahmad and J. L. 
Esposito, New York, NY: Altamira 
Press, 2004, pp. 164–197. 
 
• Michael J. Stevens, “What is Terror-
ism and Can Psychology Do Anything 
to Prevent It?”,   Behavioral  Science and 
Law, Vol 23: (2005) pp507-526. 
 
• Liakatali Takim, “From Conversion to 
Conversation: Interfaith Dialogue in 
Post 9-11 America,” The Muslim 
World, Vol. 94, June 2004. 
 
• C. D. Walton, “Not Only Islamism: 
Great Power Politics and the Future 
of Terrorism,” Comparative Strategy, 
Vol. 26, 2007, 21-37. 
 
• Montasser al-Zayyat, The Road to Al-
Qaeda: The Story of Bin Laden’s 
Right-Hand Man, Pluto Press, Lon-
don, UK, 2004. 
Terrorism, Islamism, and Western Liberal Democracies
Journalof Global Development and Peace
11. (Kramer, 2003) 
www.meforum.org/541/coming-
to-terms-islamists-or-
fundamentalists  
12. Evidence for this position may be 
found in, for example, John L. 
Esposito & Dalia Mogahed, Who 
Speaks for Islam? What a Billion 
Muslims Really Think, (New York, 
NY: Gallup Press, 2007) pp.69-70.  
13. Ibid  
14. Fathali M. Moghadam, “The New 
Global American Dilemma and 
Terrorism,” Political Psychology, Vol. 
30, No. 3, 2009, p.373.  
15. Ibid.  
16. Ibid.  
17. See Walter Enders and Todd 
Sandler, The Political Economy of 
Terrorism, (Cambridge, UK: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2006) pp. 
84-110.  
18. Ian Palmer, “Terrorism, suicide 
bombing, fear and mental health,” 
International Review of Psychiatry, June 
2007; 19(3): p. 296.  
19. Michael J. Stevens, “What is Ter-
rorism and Can Psychology Do 
Anything to Prevent It?,”  Behav-
ioral Science and Law, Vol. 23: (2005) 
pp507-526.  
20. Enders and Sandler, p50.  
21. Enders and Sandler, pp.25-27.  
5. For more on this, see for example.  
Samuel Huntington, The Clash of 
Civilizations, Foreign Affairs, 
Summer 1993, pp22-49.; Bernard 
Lewis, “Freedom and Justice in 
Islam,” Social Science and Modern So-
ciety, Volume 44, Number 2, pp.66-
70.  
6. Martin Kramer, “Coming to Terms, 
Fundamentalists or Islamists?” Middle 
East Quarterly (Spring 2003), pp. 
65-77. Also at 
www.meforum.org/541/coming-
to-terms-islamists-or-
fundamentalists; accessed 
11/08/2010. 
7. Kramer, 2003; 
www.meforum.org/541/coming-
to-terms-islamists-or-
fundamentalists 
8. Graham E. Fuller, Islamic Funda-
mentalism in the Northern Tier 
Countries: An Integrative View 
(Santa Monica: RAND, 1991), p. 2, 
9. Graham E. Fuller, The Future of 
Political Islam, (New York: Pal-
grave-Macmillan, 2003) pp. xi-xii.  
10. Remarks by Robert H. Pelletreau, 
Jr., Middle East Policy Council, 
May 26, 1994, "Symposium: Resur-
gent Islam in the Middle East," 
Middle East Policy, Fall 1994, p. 2. 
Cited in (Kramer, 2003) 
www.meforum.org/541/coming-
to-terms-islamists-or-
fundamentalists  
Terrorism, Islamism, and Western Liberal Democracies
47
48 Journal of Global Development and Peace
30. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, 
p. 257.  
31. Marvasti, p. 52.  
32. Jonathan Githens-Mazer and 
Robert Lambert, “Why conven-
tional wisdom on radicalization 
fails: the persistence of a failed dis-
course,”  International Affairs  86: 4 
(2010) 889–890;  Blackwell Pub-
lishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs . 
33. Ibid.  
34. Ibid. p. 901.  
35. Palmer, p. 296.  
36. M.P. Arena and B. A. Arrigo, p. 
486-487. 
37. Palmer, p. 295.  
38. M.P. Arena and B. A. Arrigo, p. 
500.  
39. Ibid., p. 500.  
40. Jerrold M. Post, Farhana Ali, 
Schuyler W. Henderson, Stephen 
Shanfield,Jeff Victoroff and Stevan 
Weine,  “The Psychology of Sui-
cide Terrorism,” Psychiatry 72(1) 
Spring 2009, p14.  
41. Palmer, p. 296.  
42. Palmer, p.  296.  
43. Jane I. Smith, “Muslims as Part-
ners in Interfaith Encounter: Mod-
22. Enders and Sandler, p.257.  
23. Jamshid A. Marvasti, ”What Moti-
vates the Suicide Bomber?” in Psy-
cho-Political Aspects of Suicide 
Warriors, Terrorism and Martyr-
dom, (Springfield, IL: Charles 
Thomas Publishers, 2008) p52.  
24. The effects of the September 11th 
terror attacks have been felt 
widely. See for example Asmund-
son, Carleton, Wright, and Taylor, 
“Psychological Sequelae of Remote 
Exposure to the September 11th 
Terrorist Attacks in Canadians 
with and Without Panic,” Cognitive 
Behaviour Therapy Vol 33, No 2, 
pp.51-59, 2004;  
25. Richman, Cloninger, Rospenda, 
“Macrolevel Stressors, Terrorism, 
and Mental Health Outcomes: 
Broadening the Stress Paradigm,” 
American Journal of Public Health, 
Vol 98, No.2, February 2008, pp. 
323-329. 
26. Jamshid A.  Marvasti and Valerie 
L. Dripchak, “Controversy in 
Definitions of Suicide Bombers/
Warriors” in Jamshid A. Marvasti, 
Psycho-Political Aspects of Suicide 
Warriors, Terrorism and Martyr-
dom, (Springfield, IL: Charles 
Thomas Publishers, 2008) p.3-9.  
27. Enders and Todd Sandler, p. 3.  
28. Marvasti and Dripchak, pp. 4-7.  
29. Enders and Sandler, p. 222.  
Terrorism, Islamism, and Western Liberal Democracies
Journalof Global Development and Peace
55. This is described more fully in Ro-
han Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: 
Global Network of Terror (New 
York, NY; Columbia University 
Press, 2002). 
56. Enders and Sandler, pp.108-109.  
57. Enders and Sandler, pp.108-109.  
58. Mark R. Dixon, Kimberly M. 
Zlomke, & Ruth Anne Rehfeldt, 
“Restoring Americans’ Nonequiva-
lent Frames of Terror: An Applica-
tion of Relational Frame Theory,”  
The Behavior Analyst Today Volume 
7, Number 3, 2006, p289.  
59. Ibid. p. 289.  
60. Palmer, p. 295.  
61. Palmer, p. 295.  
62. See Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al 
Qaeda: Global Network of Terror 
(New York, NY; Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2002).  For more in-
formation on the radicalization of 
Dr. Ayman Zawahiri, see Mon-
tasser al-Zayyat, The Road to Al-
Qaeda: The Story of Bin Laden’s 
Right-Hand Man, Pluto Press, 
London, UK, 2004;  For a descrip-
tion of the historical context lead-
ing to the radicalization of certain 
Al-Qaeda terrorists, John Cooley, 
Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, Amer-
ica, and International Terrorism, 
Third edition, Pluto Press, Lon-
don, U.K., 2002.  
63. Enders and Sandler, pp.84-110 
els for Dialogue”, in Muslims’ 
Place in the American Public 
Square: Hope, Fears, and Aspira-
tions, eds Z. H. Bukhari, S. S. 
Nyang,M. Ahmad and J. L. 
Esposito, New York, NY: Al-
tamira Press, 2004, pp. 164–197.  
44. Esposito & Mogahed, Who Speaks 
for Islam? What a Billion Muslims 
Really Think, pp. 69-70.  
45. Jerrold M. Post, et al. p14.  
46. Marvasti, p. 21.  
47. Marvasti, p. 34-52.  
48. Post et al., p. 28-29.  
49. Post et al. pp. 28-29.  
50. Enders and Sandler, pp. 84-110.  
51. Jamshid Marvasti, “The Failure of 
Counterterrorism: The Need for a 
Psychosocial and Nonmilitary So-
lution” in Psycho-Political Aspects 
of Suicide Warriors, Terrorism and 
Martyrdom, (Springfield, IL: 
Charles C. Thomas Publisher, Ltd. 
2008)p. 167-183.  
52. Ibid, p. 171.  
53. Liakatali Takim, “From Conver-
sion to Conversation: Interfaith 
Dialogue in Post 9-11 America,” 
The Muslim World, Vol. 94, June 
2004. p.345.  
54. Ibid.  
Terrorism, Islamism, and Western Liberal Democracies
49
50 Journal of Global Development and Peace
cance of Identity in Muslim-
Christian Encounter,” Islam and 
Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 20, 
No. 2, 153-170, April 2009.  
75. Mahmoud Ayoub, “Christian-
Muslim Dialogue: Goals and Ob-
stacles,” The Muslim World, Vol. 94; 
July 2004, pp. 314-316.  
76. Ibid.  
77. Ibid.  
78. Marvasti, 34-52.  
79. Douglass Pratt, “Necessary Non-
Apodicity: Hermeneutic Priority 
and Textual Authority in Christian-
Muslim Dialogue,” p.303.  
80. Liakatali Takim, 2004, p.354.  
81. Jane I. Smith, “Muslims as Part-
ners in Interfaith Encounter: Mod-
els for Dialogue”, pp. 164–197.  
82. Argon, Kemal, 'Strategies for In-
terreligious and Inter-Muslim Dia-
logue: A Proposed Methodol-
ogy',Journal of Muslim Minority Af-
fairs, 2009, Vol. 29:3, 2009; pp. 355
-367.  
83. Bud Heckman and Rori Neiss, In-
teractive Faith: The Essential In-
terreligious Community Building 
Handbook (Woodstock, VT: Sky-
light Paths Publishing, 2008). 
84. Muhammad Abu-Nimer, Nonvio-
lence and Peacebuilding in Islam.
64. Palmer, p. 296.  
65. Palmer, p. 296.  
66. Post, et al. p 27.  
67. Janice Bell Meisenhelder and John 
P. Marcum, “Terrorism, Post-
traumatic Stress, Coping Strategies, 
and Spiritual Outcomes,” Journal of 
Religion and Health, (2009) Vol. 48, 
p. 55 Springer Science and Busi-
ness Media, B.V.  
68. Meisenhelder and Marcum, p. 54.  
69. Meisenhelder and Marcum, p. 55. 
70. See “Ta Vara Pa Antivaldsinitia-
tivet” Abo Underratelser, Turku, 
Finland, March 23, 1994.  
71. For more explanation of this con-
cept, see Muhammad Abu-Nimer, 
Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in 
Islam, University Press of Florida, 
Gainsville, Florida, 2003. 
72. Douglass Pratt, “Necessary Non-
Apodicity: Hermeneutic Priority 
and Textual Authority in Christian-
Muslim Dialogue,” Islam and Chris-
tian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 20, No. 
3, 291-303, July 2009.  
73. Liakatali Takim, “From Conver-
sion to Conversation: Interfaith 
Dialogue in Post 9-11 America,” 
The Muslim World, Vol. 94, June 
2004, p. 354.  
74. For some description of this, see 
Melanie Prideaux, “The Signifi-
Terrorism, Islamism, and Western Liberal Democracies
Journalof Global Development and Peace
91. Mahmoud Ayoub, “Christian-
Muslim Dialogue: Goals and Ob-
stacles,” The Muslim World, Vol. 94; 
July 2004, pp. 315.  
(Gainsville, Florida: University 
Press of Florida, 2003). 
85. This is explained more fully by 
Ataullah Siddiqui, Christian-
Muslim Dialogue in the Twentieth 
Century, (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1997). 
86. See http://www.isna.net/
interfaith/default.aspx  
87. See Douglass Pratt, The Vatican in 
dialogue with Islam: Inclusion and 
Engagement, Islam and Christian-
Muslim Relations, Vol. 21, No. 3, 
July 2010, pp. 245-262.  
88. Douglas Pratt, "The World Coun-
cil of Churches in Dialogue with 
Muslims: Retrospect and Prospect, 
“Islam and Christian-Muslim Rela-
tions.” Volume 20, Issue 1. January 
2009, pp. 21–42.  
89. See Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and 
Jane I. Smith, The Quest for “A 
Common Word”: Initial Christian 
Responses to a Muslim Initiative, 
Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 
Vol. 20, No. 4, 369-388, October 
2009.  
90. As described earlier, the use of the 
term “Islamist” here can be prob-
lematic but will be used in the 
broadest possible sense to describe 
any Muslim interested in politics 
generally. See Graham E. Fuller, 
The Future of Political Islam, 
(New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 
2003), pp. xi-xii.  
Terrorism, Islamism, and Western Liberal Democracies
51
